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J.O. Krowina*

American and Canadian
Responses to the Challenge
of Small Power Production

Introduction
Small power producers' are in the vanguard of the movement towards the
increased use of "alternative" modes of generating electricity. Wind,
water, solar, biomass, and cogeneration (which creates useful heat and
electricity in one process) power sources promise increased efficiency,
reduced environmental impacts and increased energy self-sufficiency.
This paper undertakes to examine the interactions between small
power producers and the established utility sector in North America. In
particular, it examines the economic and institutional barriers faced by
small producers attempting to gain access to utility-controlled electricity
markets.
In the United States, significant movement towards overcoming these
barriers began in 1978 with the passage of the Public Utility Regulatory
Policies Act (PURPA)2 aimed at, inter alia, encouraging the growth of
small power production. As a result, the United States has become the
world leader in small power. Canada, lacking any similar initiative, has
been left far behind.
The thesis of this paper is that the American experience with small
powerproduction provides auseful model for legislators and policy-makers
working towards developing a viable small power production sector in
Canada. In the first part of the paper I will provide an "electric primer"
for readers unfamiliar with basic electrical concepts, generation
technologies and the workings of the electricity industry in North
America. In Part II, I will outline the problems currently faced by the
established utility sector and the benefits which may accrue to society by
turning to small power production. The third part of the paper will set out
the institutional and economic obstacles faced by both American and
Canadian small producers. An analysis of the American response to the

*B.A. (Hons.),M.A., LL.B. (Dalhousie) Student-at-law, McJannetRich, Winnipeg, Manitoba

1. Relatively small-scale, privately-owned, decentralized electricity generation facilities not
owned by established regulated public or private utilities. Synonyms include non-utility
generators (NUGs), independent power producers (IPPs) and "parallel generators".
2. 16 U.S.C. s. 824 (1988).
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challenge of small power production comprises the paper's fifth part.
Finally, I will survey the Canadian experience in this field with particular
reference to Alberta and Nova Scotia. The "lessons" derived from the
American experience with small power will be used as a basis for
comparative evaluation and for suggesting legislative and policy reforms
which may assist in overcoming entrenched impediments to small power
production in Canada.
I. An ElectricPrimer
1. Basic Concepts of Electricity andElectricalTechnology
Electricity is a "fundamental form of energy or capacity for doing work".'
Commercial electricity may be thought of as a stream of electrons flowing
through a wire. "Voltage" refers to the magnitudeof that flow; the higher
the voltage, the greater the flow of electricity. Electricity is transmitted
over long distances at high voltage and then mechanically "transformed"
into low voltage electricity suitable for distribution to individual
consumers.4
The generation of electricity is basically simple. Fuel (traditionally oil,
coal or natural gas) is burned in a boiler to produce steam, which turns a
turbine. The turning turbine shaft provides mechanical energy which,
combined with a device called a generator, produces electrical energy.
Electrical output is measured in watts, hundreds of watts ("kilowatts" or
kw) or thousands of kilowatts ("megawatts" or mw). The maximum
electrical output from a generating plant is called its "capacity rating".
For instance, the capacity rating of a smaller-sized coal-fired plant might
be 165 mw; that of a CANDU nuclear plant 640-680 mw; that of a small
wind turbine generator 50 kw. Electrical consumption is measured in
terms of kilowatt-hours (kwh), which refers to akilowattused for an hour.
An average household in the United States uses about 700 kwh monthly.'
Since electricity cannot be stored (except in batteries) it must be
constantly available to users. The minimum level of demand placed upon
an electrical system by users is called "base load", while the maximum
level of demand is called "peak load". Accordingly, the generating
capacity used by a utility to satisfy base load is called "base capacity"
while that used for peak load is called "peak capacity". Utilities must be
able to satisfy base load requirements while maintaining sufficient
reserve capacity to meet peak load requirements. Complex calculations

3. Tomain, Hickey and Hollis, EnergyLawandPolicy(Cincinnati: Anderson, 1989), atp. 445.

4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
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are required to match the supply of and demand for electricity not only to
in demand, but also to
accommodate daily and seasonal variations
6
system.
the
of
needs
estimate the future
2. Small PowerProductionTechnology
Small power production typically employs one of several renewable
forms of energy: solar, small hydroelectric, wind, biomass or geothermal.
Another small-scale energy source is cogeneration, which may utilize
renewable or fossil fuels. A brief7 description of each technology will set
the stage for further discussion.
There are two main types of solar electric technology. Photovoltaic
cells produce electricity directly when photons (light particles) are
absorbed by a solar cell made of semiconducting materials. The second
type of solar technology is called "solar thermal". Solar thermal systems
employ a large reflective surface to heat a fluid then used to create steam
to drive a turbine. Solar energy is the "ultimate" energy source; low cost
(potentially), abundant, and non-polluting. 8 However, photo-voltaic and
solar thermal technology is not yet sufficiently advanced to be able to
generate electricity on a large scale at a cost competitive to other modes
of energy production.
Hydroelectricity is generated by flowing water turning a
turbine-generator. This technology is well-established, efficient, and
reliable. Of course, hydroelectric facilities need not be small.
Environmental consequences (aside from large projects and effects of
water accumulation upstream of dams) are minimal. Power generated
from such facilities ranges from 50 kw and up. 9
Wind-power systems utilize vertical or horizontal-axis wind-turbines
to generate electricity. These latter-day "windmills" are grouped in
wind-farms located in mountain passes, coastal plains, and other windy

6. Ibid., at pp. 445-46.
7. There is a broad and growing literature on renewable energy technologies: See, e.g., C.J.
Weinberg and R.H. Williams, "Energy from the Sun", Scientific American 263 (3) (September
1990): 146-155; Environment Council of Alberta, Renewable Energy: the Power and the
Potential. Prepared by the Energy and Non-Renewable Resources Sub-Committee of the
Public Advisory Committees to the Environment Council of Alberta (Environment Council of
Alberta, 1988): Alternative Energy Technology in Canada (Ottawa: National Research

Council of Canada (Energy Division), 1986): J. Passmore and R. Jackson,RenewableEnergy:
Innovation in Action (Ottawa: Science Council of Canada, 1984): International Energy
Agency, Renewable Sources of Energy (Paris: OECD, 1987): A. Wyatt, Electric Power:
Challenges and Choices (Toronto: Book Press, 1986), at pp. 64-71.
8. C.J. Weinberg and R.H. Williams, supra, note 7, at pp. 147-48.
9. Huss, Richmond and Badger, "Alternative Generation Technologies: Can They Compete?",
Pub. Util. Fort. March 15, 1984, at pp. 17-21.
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areas. Individual turbines generally produce between 50 kw and 500 kw
of electricity.10
Biomass electrical generation involves burning naturally-occurring
materials (e.g., wood "wastes" from sawmills) to produce steam used to
generate electricity." These facilities may range up to 100 mw capacity,
but are only economical when low-cost biomass fuel is readily available.12
Negative aspects of biomass power include potential deforestation and
smokestack emissions.
Geothermal plants use thermal energy from the earth's core to generate
electricity. This form of energy is well-suitedfor facilities of 20-50 mw.' 3
Cogeneration is "the simultaneous production of electric power and
useful thermal energy in one technological process". Typically, such
facilities burn renewable or fossil fuel to produce steam for an "on-site"
industrial application (usually for large industries requiring a great deal
of heat for production purposes such as chemical plants, pulp and paper
mills, oil refineries, smelters, and foundries). The steam is then also used
to generate electricity to meet the needs of the facility. Any excess
electricity generated is sold to a utility. 4 The amount of electricity
produced by a cogeneration facility depends mainly upon the size of the
particular industrial establishment to which it is attached, but tends to
range between 10-300 mw. 15Cogeneration of heat and power by industry
16
dates back to the last century.
3. The Nature andFunctions of Electric Utilities
Before we consider any further aspects of small power production, it is
necessary to have a basic understanding of the institutional, legal, and
economic context of electricity generation in North America. Comparative
analysis (between territorial jurisdictions and between specific utilities)
is relatively straightforward because the industry as a whole is structured
around the same basic set of principles.

10. J. Passmore and R. Jackson, supra,note 7.
11. Huss et al., supra,note 9.
12. C.J. Weinberg and R.H. Williams, supra,note 7, at p. 151.

13. Huss et al, supra, note 9.
14. A.E. Reinsch and E.F. Battle, Industrial Cogenerationin Canada (Calgary: Canadian
Energ" Resources Institute, 1987), at pp. xv, 1-2.

15. Du, Chemical in Texas generates 1300 mw by cogeneration, using heat to process
chemicals and selling some of the electricity to Houston Lighting and Power. On the smaller
end of the scale is a 65 kw diesel-powered cogeneration system designed for a Macdonald's
restaurant. C. Flavin, Electricity's Future: the Shift to Efficiency and Small-scale Power.
Worldwatch Paper 61 (NY: Worldwatch Instit., 1984), at pp. 30-34.

16. A.E. Reinsch and E.F. Battle, supra, note 14, at pp. 4 -5 .
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Generally, "public utilities" are publicly or privately owned business
organizations engaged in the provision of water, gas, telegraph and
telephone services, electricity and streettransport."7 Utilities are considered
"public" because they are legally deemed to be "affected with a public
interest"' 8
Utilities possess several key characteristics. First, they provide
"essential" services for which consumer demand is less flexible (or
elastic) than for many other goods or services. 19 Second, they provide
services which can neither be stored nor deferred. Third, they require
equipment.
large initial outlays of capital to build facilities and purchase
20
These outlays must be recouped over a period of time.
For my purpose, however, I will focus upon two further defining
characteristics. Public utilities are usually monopolies. "Monopoly" in
this context means that a utility is the holder of an exclusive franchise to
provide a stipulated service over a defined service area.' Another
important characteristic is that public utility monopolies are conferred by
governments. Thus, for example, in Nova Scotia the PowerCorporation
Act 22 confers authority upon the Nova Scotia Power Corporation (the
provincial electric utility) to
"regulate and control the generation, transformation, transmission,
distribution, supply and use of power in the province...23
Essentially, governments grant utilities monopolies in exchange for
broad powers of regulatory oversight, including the authority to regulate
prices.' Utilities receive the right to occupy anon-competitive marketplace
and to realize a "just and reasonable" rate of return on their investment.
Moreover, utilities are legally obliged to provide universal service at
reasonable prices?
Government, for its part, receives the assurance that electrical energy
will be supplied to all who require it. It may also intervene to insure that

17. M.T. Farris and R.J. Sampson, PublicUtilities:Regulation, Managementand Ownership
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973), at p. 18.
18. Ibid.
19. That is, "the quantity purchased is normally not significantly affected by small price
changes". Ibid.
20. Ibid., at pp. 18-21.
21. Tomain, et al, supra,note 3, at p. 36.
22. R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 351.
23. Ibid., at s. 33(l).
24. Farris and Sampson, note 17, at p. 22 .
25. Ibid., at p. 21.
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a high quality of service is provided at a reasonable cost to rate-payers. 26
Each of these objectives are aspects of government's overriding duty to
foster economic growth.
There is considerable overlap between the interests of government and
those of utilities. Economic growth is an imperative of government and
of any corporate entity within free-market economies. For example,
section 6 of Nova Scotia's Power CorporationAct 27 sets out the raison
d'etre of the Nova Scotia Power Corporation: "to develop forNova Scotia
2
the maximum use of power on an economic and efficient basis". 1
Governments delegate utility oversight functions to administrative bodies
usually called "Public Utilities Commissions" or some variant thereof.
These bodies exercise no small power in view of the rather"open-textured"
(that is, indeterminate or open to various interpretations) standards (such
as "public convenience and necessity") they are called upon to interpret
in discharging their statutory duties. 29 There may be considerable
movement of Commission personnel between more openly "political"
jobs in government and jobs with regulatory commissions. 0
Finally, the rate-payer or customer is entitled to be charged a "just and
reasonable" price for electricity.31 Also, rate-payers are entitled to receive
2
service free of undue discrimination.1
4. Note on Private vs. Public Utilities
Does the presence/absence of the profit motive in some way affect or
determine the behaviour of a utility? The answer is "yes". For while the
privately-owned utilities must turn a profit in order to remain in existence

26. For example, regulatory authorities are empowered to compel the utility to use certain
financial and accounting practices, expand service to new areas, continue operating certain
unprofitable aspects of its business, prohibit discrimination against customers for services, and

so on. Ibid., at pp. 69-71.
27. R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 351.
28. Ibid., s. 6.
29. H. Wade MacLauchlan, "Judicial Review of Administrative Interpretations of Law: How
Much Formalism Can We Reasonably Bear?" (1986), U. Toronto L.J. 343, at pp. 352-354.

30. Farris and Sampson, supra, note 20, at pp. 64-65.
31. A "just and reasonable" rate of return realized by utilities is virtually equivalent to a "just
and reasonable rate" paid by consumers. This is because an unfairly high rate of return, by

definition, means that rates are unreasonably high. Ibid., at p. 79.
32. "Discrimination" may be defined as treating similar customers significantly differently, or
as treating significantly differing customers similarly. Ibid., at p. 70.
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publicly-owned utilities can operate indefinitely on a break-even basis, or
even at a loss, so long as the public purse is available to subsidize and/or
33
underwrite its operations.
Later in this paper I will argue that small power producers have proven
to be more economically competitive with large utilities in the United
States than in Canada in part because American utilities, unlike their
Canadian cousins, are forced to charge rates which more accurately
reflect the "real" cost of producing electricity. This is because they must
function as self-sustaining businesses with less support from governments.
Public utilities may also be susceptible to a larger degree of "political"
influence than private utilities by virtue of government's power of
appointment and by specific provisions of enabling statutes which
incorporate governmental policy objectives2 4
U1.

The Crisis of "Big Power"

That the electricity industry in North America is of a monopolistic
character is indisputable. But why should any utility receive a monopoly
in electricity production? The very idea of monopoly is anathema to
market-based economics.
In fact, there was a "free market" in electricity which obtained from the
later nineteenth century to the early twentieth century. In those days
freebooting entrepreneurs would approach town and city councils with
proposals to establish what are now considered to be essential services
(water, gas, electricity). The results were often unsatisfactory. Abusive
pricing practices, slipshod service, mechanical failures, and utility collapses
35
(due to under-capitalization) were common.
It also became increasingly clear that competition among private
electric utilities made no economic sense. Competition led to the
unnecessary duplication of electricity transmission and distribution lines.36

33. E.g., Nova Scotia Power Corp. pays no taxes; it may borrow money and issue bonds on the
credit of the Province of Nova Scotia. See PowerCorporationAct R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 351, ss.
8(3), 16. Many public utilities in Canada have in fact operated at a loss through much of the
1980s including the Nova Scotia Power Corporation. See infra, p. 555.
34. Farris and Sampson, supra,note 17, at pp. 282-83. See also Public Utilities Act, R.S.N.S.
1989, c. 380, s. 48, which directs the N.S. Power Corp. to "maximize the use of indigenous
resources". Regional development (the support of faltering Cape Breton Coal producers)
objectives thus supplement the goal of providing power on an "economic and efficient basis".
35. For an excellent review of utility activity during this period see C. Armstrong and H.V.
Nelles,Monopoly'sMoment:The OrganizationandRegulationofCanadianUtilities,1830-1930
(Philadelphia: Temple Univ. Press, 1986). See also N.R. Ball, ed.,.Building Canada:AHistory
of Public Works (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1988), at pp. 170-71.
36. Tomain, et al,supra,note 3, at p. 470.
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Economies of scale could be realized by building ever-larger generating
37
facilities.
Government acceptance of the theory of "natural monopoly" eventually
led to the demise of utility competition and the instantiation of public
utilities as regulated monopolies. 8
The 1945-73 period was "Big Power's" heyday. For example, the
largest coal-fired plants in 1955 were about 300 mw. By the early 1970s,
39
1,300 mw capacity ratings were common.
The bubble burst in 1973 when oil prices doubled almost overnight.
Electricity rates began to climb, n" leading to a sudden, unforeseen drop in
demand.4" Many of the large, expensive facilities under construction at
that time had been undertaken with the expectation that the demand they
wer' intended to satisfy would materialize just prior to their completion.
As aresult, utilities were often faced with new capacity coming "onstream"
at a time of constant or decreasing consumer demand. Since public utility
commissions generally refused to increase rates with the frequency
requested by the utilities, many were forced to borrow money from
capital markets at high interest rates.42 Difficulties with spiralling costs
were only compounded by increasingly stringent safety and pollution
control requirements, as well as pressures from environmentalists and
anti-nuclear activists. In short, it was no longer apparent that bigger
automatically meant better.
1. Economic Advantages of Small PowerProduction
The high cost of producing electricity in the 1970s coupled with uncertain
consumer demand significantly changed the outlook for small power
producers. The achievement of greater economies of scale was hindered
by rising fuel prices. 43 Suddenly the emphasis on producing more shifted
to producing more efficiently.
37. Le., the cost of producing a unit of electricity falls with each additional unit produced.
"Because electricity production is so capital intensive [not labour intensive], economies of
scale dominate an electric utility because costs decrease as sales increase." See J. Fuller
"Cogeneration and Small PowerProduction: Florida's Approach to Decentralized Generation",
(1984), 9 Nova L.J. 25, at p. 27.

38. The rationale for eliminating competition, from a governmental viewpoint, was that "one
enterprise's fixed costs can be spread across more sales than if two firms must split the market

demand. Thus, the idea of a government imposed monopoly of power production and
distribution was well-founded and in the ratepayer's best interest." Ibid., at p. 28.
39. B.S. Gentry, "Public Utility Participation in Decentralized Power Production", 5 Harv.
Envtl. L. Rev. 297, at p. 299, n. 24.
40. Between 1973-1979 prices nearly doubled. Ibid., at p. 300, n. 29.
41. From 7% to 2.5% annually by 1973-74. Ibid., at n. 31.
42. Ibid., at p. 300.
43. A.E. Reinsch and E.F. Battle, supra, note 14, at p. 11.
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Conventional utility power systems (for instance an oil-fired steam
plant) are relatively inefficient, utilizing only 35% of the heat energy
released by burning fuel. 44 Cogeneration systems, on the other hand,
5
boast an efficiency rating of up to 85%.!
Electricity transmission and distribution networks or "grids" are not
perfect conductors of electricity. A certain percentage (usually about 5%)
of electricity carried from generation to end use is lost due to such
"bleeding". The longer the distance travelled, the greater the loss.
Centralized powergeneration maximizes transmission losses by spreading
each generating station's "customer load" over a wide geographical area.
Such losses are minimized when the generation station and the customer
are in relatively close proximity. By building smaller, decentralized
generation plants in greater numbers throughout a utility service area,
greater efficiency is achieved.46
Capital costs of small power plants are lower than those of expensive
"megaprojects", reducing risks borne by rate-payers ultimately responsible
for financing such projects. Cost overruns in large-plant construction
have become the rule rather than the exception. 47
Small power projects can be built relatively quickly (often within one
or two years), making such projects more responsive to actual demand for
electricity. As it is, "megaprojects" require long "lead times" to be able
to be built in time to meet anticipated demand. 4As industry analyst Jeff
Passmore observes "Since several hundred megawatts of consumer
demand cannot be turned on overnight, these new "lumps" of electricity
create, and indeed tend to institutionalize, considerable excess system

44. Conventional plants generate steam in a boiler which is then passed through a turbine to
generate electricity. The steam is then exhausted to a condenser for cooling. Up to 50% of the
burned fuel's heat energy is lost through cooling; 15% is lost through the smokestack as flue
gases. Total energy loss: 65%. Ibid., at pp. 9-11.
45. Cogeneration systems get "more bang for the buck" by taking advantage of the principle
that less fuel is required to produce useful heat and electricity together than to produce them
separately. By using steam not only to generate electricity but also as a source of "process heat"
its efficiency rating may achieve 85%. Ibid.
46. J. Passmore, The Private Power Optionfor Canada (Ottawa: Passmore & Associates,
1987), at p. 16.
47. For example, Ontario Hydro's Darlington nuclear plant was initially priced at $4.07 billion.
By December 1981 the cost had risen to $6.25 bil.; by Feb 1982 it was $8.2 bil., and by 1984
between $1 I and $12 billion. In short, "An epidemic of cost overruns...seems to plague
[Ontario] Hydro.". L. Solomon, Power: At What Cost?. (Toronto: Energy Probe Research
Foundation, 1984), at p. 71. Such overruns are due to many factors: the inherent inefficiency
of large bureaucratic structures, the length of time it takes to build such stations (often 10+
years) and the increasing sophistication of the technologies involved; see ibid.
48. A nuclear plant the size of Ontario Hydro's Darlington plant takes 13-14 years to build. J.
Passmore, supra, note 46, at p. 19.
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capacity."4 9 As a result, rate-payers may be saddled with enormous
"upfront" capital costs to meet load demand which may not materialize
on time.
Small power producers are able to build and operate generating
facilities at a lower cost than large utilities. The huge scale of an
established utility's operations (which allows it to undertake "mega"
projects) ensure high "overhead" costs for office staff and skilled labour.5 0
Finally, the cost ofproducing"altemative" energy has steadily declined
over the past decade. The cost of solar thermal power has fallen 66%,
wind power 75%, and photovoltaic electricity 90%.51

a) EnvironmentalConcerns
It is generally acknowledged that, on the whole, small power production
is environmentally more benign than the conventional status quo. The
dangers of acid rain, carbon dioxide,52 nuclear waste 5 3 and large hydro
projects 54 may be substantially reduced by small power technologies.
This is not to say that there are no adverse environmental effects
attached to small power production, however. The land area required to
support an exclusively renewable-based energy economy would be
considerable (tree farms, wind farms, and so on).5 5 The ecological
disruptions caused by damming every small river and stream would be
intolerable to many. Whirring wind turbine noise might be objectionable
to some. Nevertheless, small power production still poses fewer
56
environmental risks than conventional modes of generation.

49. Ibid., at p. 18.
50. For example, a Nova Scotian producer was able to build a small hydro facility for much
less than the amount Nova Scotia Power Corporation had estimated as the lowest possible

cost.Nova Scotia Power's estimate: $950,000 (which it deemed prohibitive): small producer's
costs: $250,000. J.Passmore, supra., note 46, at p. 8.

51. C. Flavin and N. Lenssen, "A Renewable Future", Environ. Sci. Technol., vol. 25(5), 1991,
at p. 834.
52. W. Fulkerson, R. Judkins and M. Sanghvi, "Energy from Fossil Fuels", Scientific American

263(3) (Sept. 1990), at p. 129.
53. C.P. Shea, Renewable Energy: The Power andthe PotentialWorldwatch Paper 81 (New
York: Worldwatch Institute, 1988), at p. 48.

54. E.g., witness the growing controversy over the Province of Quebec's recently proclaimed
intention to develop "Phase 2" of the gigantic James Bay hydroelectric project: J.Goddard,

"Damned if they Do", Harrowsmith, XV (93)(Sept/Oct. 1990), at pp. 40- 67 ; F. Berkes, "The
James Bay Hydroelectric Project", Alternatives 17(3)(Nov]Dec 1990); at p. 20.
55. See R. Paehlke, Environmentalism and the Future of ProgressivePolitics (New Haven:

Yale Univ. Press, 1989), at pp. 99-100.
56. See Holdren, Morris and Mintzer, "Environmental Aspects of Renewable Energy Sources"
(1980), S.Ann. Rev. Energy 241, at p.283.
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b)

Policy Reasonsfor FavouringSmall Power Production

Small power production can potentially provide increased local, stable
employment. The relatively simple, modular nature of the technology
is
57
skills.
maintenance
and
engineering
design,
localized
amenable to
Small power production also holds the potential of introducing
competitive market forces into presently ossified monopolistic structures
of electricity production in Canada. Lower prices to rate-payers will
ultimately result. My discussion of the American experience with limited
deregulation in the electrical energy sector will amplify this point.
Economists have also recognized that there is no compelling need for
any utility to hold a monopoly over electricity generation,as opposed to
transmission and distribution."8 Utilities have always "hooked up" many
different facilities to power "grids". There is no reason why independent
producers should not have the power from their facilities also channelled
into the network, provided that the utility is willing to transmit and
distribute their electricity.
The diverse fuels available for use by small power producers will help
to reduce overall dependency upon any single source of energy. 9 In
geopolitical terms, decreased dependency on foreign energy sources
increases domestic political independence.
Additionally, the decentralization of electrical-generation may be seen
as one aspect of a generalized popular movement towards self-(and
community-based)reliance and self-sufficiency. In plain words:
"[D]ecentralization will create smaller, more human entities, devoted to
efficiency and effectiveness, but with greater commitment to process and
human values. 60
Finally, opening the door to small power production represents a key
step in the necessary and inevitable transition of western societies to
sustainable, non-fossil-fuel based economies. The principles by which

57. "In general, renewable energy projects tend to be more labour-intensive and less capital
intensive" [than large conventional projects]: Environmental Council of Alberta, supra, note
7, at p. 26. See also R. Paehlke, supra,note 55, at pp. 104-05.
58. R.S. Handmaker, "Deregulating the Transmission of Electricity" (1989), 67 Wash. Univ.
L.Q. 435, at p. 442.

59. C.P. Shea, supra., note 53, at p. 52.
60. W. Pitman, "Foreword" to L. Solomon, supra, note 48, at p. 8. See also C. Spretnak and
F. Capra, GreenPolitics(Santa Fe: Bear and Company, 1986), and R. Paehlke, supra,note 55,

chs. 6 and 8.

534 The Dalhousie Law Journal

such an energy future might be structured are commonly referred to as a
"soft energy path" or SEP.6' Further consideration of the "SEP paradigm"
is beyond the scope of this paper.
At this point the reader may think, "If small power production is so
great then why do we not have more of it right now?" While small power
production presently plays a minor role on the Canadian energy stage,
fundamental and far-reaching change has already begun in the United
States. But before we can fully understand why small producers have
been successful in the United States, we must recognize the obstacles
small producers have faced in attempting to gain entry into both countries'
electricity industries.

M.

InstitutionalandEconomicImpedimentstoSmallPowerProduction

1. InstitutionalResistance
Utilities generally oppose small power. They sense that small producers
pose a threat to the comfortable status quo. If small producers can
generate electricity at a lower cost than the utility, or persuade regulators
that small power is a socially more desirable form of electricity generation,
then utilities face the prospects of lost revenue, customers, and
governmental support. The following text will contain several concrete
illustrations of utility resistance to the advance of small producers.
Canadian utilities have tended to be less overt than their American
counterparts in the expression of this resistance.
Regulators have tended to side with utilities. The prevalent attitude is,
"If it isn't broken then why fix it?" Small power is perceived as a threat
to the reliability of the system and rate stability.

61. These principles are: 1) an emphasis on renewable sources of energy; 2) an encouragement
of diversity in energy resources; 3) that energy sources must be matched in scale to specific
end-uses (i.e., decentralization of energy production); 4) matching energy quality to end-use
need (e.g., most dwellings need heat of less than 100'F.; solarheating provides such heat easily
and cheaply and should therefore be encouraged); 5) advocacy of "people-friendliness" in

technology-simplicity, understand-ability and safety. R. Paehlke,supra, note 55, at pp. 79-82,
and ch. 4 generally. Several articles and books have applied SEP concepts to the Canadian
context: e.g., R. Bott et al,Life After Oil (Edmonton: Hurtig, 1983); D.B. Brooks, Zero Energy
Growth for Canada (Toronto: McClelland, 1981); R. Paehlke, "Environmental and Social

Impacts of a Soft Energy Path" Alternatives 12 (Fall 1984): 21-24; T. Schrecker, The
ConserverSociety Revisited (Ottawa: Science Council of Canada, 1983); R.Torrieetal,2125:
Soft Energy Futuresfor Canada- 1988UJpdate(Canadian Environmental Network, 1988).
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2. Economic Impediments to Small Power Production
a) Monopsony Power
In economic terms, a "monopsony" exists when there is a single buyer for
multiple sellers. A monopsonist will take advantage of this imbalanced
relationship to gain for itself the most favourable terms in any exchange
or contract between buyer and seller.6"
Monopsonist utilities can use theirvastpools of resources and expertise
to advantage against cash-and-information strapped small producers. For
example, utilities have much easier access to expert information than
small producers. It costs a small producer comparatively more money to
obtain that same information. In the context of a contract negotiation,
63
such imbalances add greatly to a small producer's "start up" costs.
b)

Price

This is the crucial issue. When more "overt" forms of resistance (such as
refusing to connect the producer into the electricity grid) are no longer
practicable, utilities may still attempt to undercut the viability of small
power producers by paying them too little for the electricity they
generate. In this section I will set out some of the key issues.
The concept of "avoided costs" has become the focus of much debate
in recent years.: The general questions in this area are posed in the
following terms: "What sorts of costs, usually borne by the utility, are
avoided by the use of non-utility generation facilities?", and "by what
standard should these costs be evaluated?"
Discussion has centered upon two key components of utility costs. The
first component is "fuel" cost. This type of cost varies according to the
amount of fuel consumed by generating plants. The more a generating
plant operates, the more fuel is consumed, and the greater the fuel cost
(other things being equal). The second component is "capacity" cost. This
refers to the cost of additional utility-built generating capacity. Capacity
costs, once incurred, do not vary with consumer demand for electricity.
Public utilities agree that small producers' power, by eliminating the
need to operate certain plants, does reduce their fuel costs. The savings
thus realized may be credited to the small producer. However, utilities
often object to paying small producers any portion of avoided capacity
costs because small producers do not generally eliminate a very significant
portion of these costs, even though small producers themselves incur
capacity costs.
62. N. Hamilton, "Standard Contracts and Prices for Small Power Producers" 11 Wm. Mitchell
L. Rev. 421 (1985), at p. 434.
63. Ibid.
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Small producers respond to this argument by contending that they
ought to receive an opportunity to be able to replace a greater portion of
utility generating capacity. They also contend that the contribution of
small producers to utility capacity should be measured in terms of the
aggregate effect of their production upon the electrical system as a whole.
Seen in this light, it becomes evident that small producers can contribute
sufficient power to a system to justify receipt of payment for avoiding
utility capacity and fuel costs.
Another problem relates to excess generating capacity. Since utilities
must add new generating capacity ahead of anticipated demand, there are
often periods during which the per-unit cost of electricity goes down. At
these times, therefore, small producers receive a low price for their
power. Small producers argue, however, that utilities should act to
prevent excess capacity from arising in the first place. It is in no one's
interest to create excess capacity in the system. The "sale" prices that
follow upon such episodes do not accurately reflect the cost of adding the
new generating capacity which gave rise to the excess in the first place.
These prices create an effective disincentive to the use of more efficient
modes of generating electricity. Consumers may be faced with a steep
rate increase when the excess disappears.64Small power reduces excess
capacity because it is more demand-responsive; that is, facilities can be
built quickly to meet actual demand as it arises.
Then there is the question whether utilities should pay small producers
at rates equivalent to those paid for expensive "peak capacity" or less
expensive "baseload capacity". Any utility, at a given moment, will have
both relatively expensive and inexpensive generating plants available to
provide power when needed. More economical plants are operated in
order to satisfy baseload demand. More expensive plants will be used
during intermittent periods of high demand. Should small producers be
paid at rates equivalent to those paid for peaking capacity or base
capacity? Or a mixture of both? In Nova Scotia, small producers are paid
at rates which reflect the costs of operating a baseload, coal-fired facility.
It is at least arguable that small producers should receive payment which
reflects some portion of peak capacity whose use is deferred by having
resort to the small producer's facility.

64. See J.F. Helliwell and A.T Cox, "Wood Wastes as an Energy Source for the B.C. Pulp and
Paper Industry". Energy Policy: the Global Challenge, P. Nemetz, ed., (Toronto: Instit. for

Research on Public Policy, 1979), at p. 260.
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c)

ProductionCosts

Finally, there are issues of "externalities". An externality is a "production
cost or benefit which is not reflected in the price of a product". 65 The
classic example is that of pollution. Pollution imposes costs on society
which must be absorbed by someone. If society must pay these costs then
the price of the product created by the pollution-causing process does not
accurately reflect its true cost of production. Small producers advocate an
increased level of "internalization" of currently-externalized costs by all
power producers including utilities. Smallfacilities generate little pollution.
As a result, internalising their pollution costs would produce little change
in their costs. On the other hand, internalising those incurred by
heavily-polluting facilities of the type commonly used by utilities would
cause utility costs to rise considerably. Small power would thus become
more cost-competitive with large utilities and society would realize a net
reduction of costs it currently bears. The same analysis can be employed
to provide some accounting for several other net benefits produced by
small power such as diversifying the fuel mix, increased employment and
so on.
The externalities issue remains unresolved. Pollution-related costs are
at the moment not generally borne by electric utilities beyond those costs
incurred in satisfying existing legislated pollution-control standards. The
key outstanding question here is whether regulatory boards can compel
utilities to pay additional avoided costs to small producers for avoiding
pollution-control (and other social) costs. No jurisdiction has done so but see my discussion of avoided costs in the United States in part IV
below.
3.

Specific Utility Concerns about Small Power Production

In 1986 the Canadian Energy Research Institute asked major Canadian
utilities to specify their concerns about the possible negative effects of an
increased reliance upon cogeneration by industry.66 Their responses
accord with the general pre-dispositions of utilities towards small producers
discussed in the previous section.67
The biggest fear amongst utilities was that the reliability of the total
electrical system would be endangered by -introducing small power
production technologies. Respondents considered small technologies

65. Tomain et al, supra, note 3, at p. 36.
66. A.E. Reinsch and E.F. Battle, supra,note 14.
67. The concerns listed below are extracted from the discussion at pp. 95-97, ibid.
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unreliable and apt to require high levels of maintenance. Utilities would
be obliged to provide electrical service to "cover" for the absence of small
producers from the grid when their new-fangled gadgetry was being
repaired. Moreover, utilities were uneasy about any circumstance in
which they lacked direct operating control over cogeneration facilities.
Another fear was that cogenerators might default on their contractual
obligations to build facilities on time. The menace of unmet demand
would loom large. As a result, a utility would have to embark upon a crash
program to build its own facilities in time to meet the anticipated demand.
This would place a strain on utility resources and/or require additional
borrowing on capital markets. Alternatively, expensive power would
have to be imported from external sources.
A second set of concerns voiced by utilities in the survey related to
threats to utility viability allegedly posed by small producers. First,
industries are autility's favourite customer. They purchase great amounts
of power. If industries cogenerate, they require less utility power. Since
utilities depend upon large industrial purchases to defray the high costs
of producing electricity, the loss of industrial revenue would shift a
greater part of the cost-burden upon the shoulders of non-industrial
rate-payers. Steep rate hikes would follow, consumers would naturally
shrink from the burden, demand would fall and utilities would end up in
financial straits.
It is generally agreed by utilities, small producers and regulatory
authorities that any changes in the specific modes by which electricity is
generated should not impact unevenly upon utility user groups (residential,
commercial or industrial). Coordinated planning strategies must be
adopted to ensure that residential users are not hit by disproportionate rate
increases.
Utilities also expressed reservations about the long-term availability
of smallpower. They suspected that it was a flash-in-the-pan. New energy
technologies or fuel sources (for instance, hydrogen) able to reduce costs
within the context of "Big Power's" established structure would render
the small power sector an instant anachronism.
Several respondents suggested that small power production also added
an unwelcome complexity to utility long-range planning. The dispersed
and decentralized nature of small power production constitutes a challenge
to utility planners. But, as stated above, small power's contribution can
easily be considered in aggregate terms. This would make utility planning
easier. In any case, decentralized facilities may increase the resilience of
utility operations in the face of disruptions of many kinds.
Many of the fears of utilities listed above are speculative in nature.
They were expressed at a time when there was in fact no significant small
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power production in Canada. In the United States, a rapidly-developing
small power sector is overcoming these fears and doubts. System reliability,
competition and new technologies are compatible. I propose now to
survey the American experience in this field.
IV.

The American Experience with Small PowerProduction

1. The Institutionaland Regulatory Framework
Privately owned (stockholders and holding companies) utilities dominate
the American electricity sector, accounting for 78.2% of total kwh sales
in the U.S. Publicly owned utilities account for 16.4% of total kwh sales
in the industry. Rural Electric Cooperatives (RECs) account for only
5.5% of total kwh sales.6 8
Jurisdiction over the electric industry is apportioned between state and
federal regulatory authorities. Section 8 ofArticle 1 of the U.S. Constitution
provides that "The Congress shall have power.., to regulate Commerce
69
... among the several States.".
Consequently, the federal regulatory authority (the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission or FERC) has authority to regulate, inter alia,
70
wholesale interstate sales and transmission ofelectricitybetween utilities.
Moreover, FERC has asserted the right to ensure that "sale" prices paid
by utilities for electricity purchased from other utilities are passed on to
retail customers in the area served by that utility.7 1Given that the industry72
has become very tightly coordinated through regional "power pools",
this is a highly significant power. It is, in fact, virtually impossible to
distinguish between interstate and intrastate flows of electricity. The
federal government thus exercises broad jurisdiction in this field.
Nevertheless, state regulatory authority applies to intrastate production,
sales and local distribution of electricity. 73

68. R.S. Handmaker, supra, note 58, at p. 435, n. 1.
69. Article VI of the Constitution provides for the supremacy of federal statutes over state
laws-opening the door for specific statutory allocation ofotherregulatory powers to the federal
level.
70. 16 U.S.C. s. 824 - etseq (1988).
71. NantahalaPower andLight v. Thornburg,476 U.S. 953 (1986).
72. "Power pooling is a voluntary effort to improve the reliability of electricity supply and
service, plan for future capacity and to operate efficiently.": P.Tomain, supra,note3, atp. 475.
73. Ibid., at p. 452.
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2. The Public Utility Regulatory PoliciesAct
In 1978, Congress enacted the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act
(PURPA)74 and sparked a revolution in the American electricity business.
Essentially,PURPAlegislatedinto existence anew sector of small,non-utility
power producers. In doing so, a "free market" wedge was driven into an
industry grown comfortable with its status as a "natural monopoly".
a) Background
Before PURPA, many utilities simply refused (and were not obliged) to
purchase power from independents or offered to pay only very low rates
for their power, rendering the enterprise uneconomical.7 5 Utilities also
charged independents excessively high rates for standby and
supplementary power. "Standby" or "backup" power is provided by
utilities to "replace energy ordinarily generated by a facility's own
equipment during an unscheduled outage-ofthe facility". 76 Supplementary
power may be purchased from a utility when the electricity needs of the
facility (or industry cogenerator) demand more power than the facility is
77
able to self-generate.
Independent producers also faced the possibility of being deemed a
"utility" and therefore bound by the full panoply of federal and state
utility regulations. For instance, in Cottonwood Mall Shopping COr. v.
Utah PowerandLightCo.,75 a private producer was required to apply for
and receive a "certificate of public convenience" in order to compete with
a utility in providing electricity to a shopping mall.79 To obtain this
certificate, one must establish a need for the provision of services to the
area the applicant wishes to serve, show that one's resources are sufficient
to support the venture planned, and establish a public interest in the
provision of these services. For small producers, the imposition of such
paperwork nightmares will often make a venture too expensive and
time-consuming to be worthwhile."

74. 16 U.S.C. ss. 796, 824 (1988).
75. B.S. Gentry, supra, note 39, atp. 316.
76. B.S. Petrus, "Decentralized Power Generation: Alternative Energy Exemption from State
Public Utility Regulation" (1986), 8 Univ. Hawaii L. Rev. 227, at pp. 231-32.

77. Ibid. When the wind dies down, for instance, a commercial establishment powered by a
wind turbine will need to call upon the utility's services to continue functioning. That same
wind turbine may also not provide sufficient energy during the commercial establishment's
busiest periods. The effect of charging a high price for such services makes wind power
economically unattractive as an alternative to utility-supplied power.
78. 440 F. 2d 36 (10th Cir. 1971).

79. Ibid.
80. T. Hagler, "Utility Purchases of Decentralized Power: The PURPA Scheme" (1983), 5

Stan. Envtl. L. Ann. 154, at p. 159.
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These factors, coupled with generalized utility resistance (illustrated
by their willingness to engage in litigation, lobbying efforts, and so on),
precluded the development of a viable small power industry despite the
rapid increase in electricity production costs which occurred in the 1970s.
In the end, it took PURPA to overcome these barriers.
b) PURPA'sScheme
PURPA's purpose was to reduce American dependence on oil imported
from foreign sources and to reduce consumption of fossil fuels by, inter
alia, energy conservation, increased energy efficiency, and increased
development of domestic energy resources. 8 The promotion of
cogeneration and small power production formed one component of this
national energy strategy.
The general thrust of PURPA was to attack the aforementioned
institutional and market barriers to small power producer participation in
the energy marketplace by: 1) compelling utilities to interconnect with
and to purchase electrical energy from cogenerators and small power
producers that meet certain specific criteria; 2) prohibiting utilities from
charging unreasonably high or discriminatory rates for back-up or
supplementary power; 3) precluding the classification of cogenerators or
small power producers as utilities and thus exempting them from certain
laws and regulations (including the Federal Power Act, the Public Utility
Holding Company Act, and state laws and regulations respecting the
determination of electricity rates and financial and organizational aspects
2
of utility regulation).1
Section 201 is the relevant definitional section of PURPA. A small
power production facility is one which produces no more than 80
megawatts of electricity using a primary fuel source of biomass, waste,
renewable resources, geothermal resources or any combination thereof.8 3
A cogeneration facility is a facility which produces electrical energy and
steam or forms of useful energy used for industrial, commercial, heat or
cooling purposes. s4 The section also requires FERC to enact regulations

81. See 1978 U.S. C.C.A.N. 7659, 7673-80.
82. N. Hamilton, supra, note 62, at p. 428.
83. 16 U.S.C. s. 796 (17)(A) (1988).
84. 16 U.S.C. s. 796 (18)(A)(1988).
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further defining the characteristics of small power production and
cogeneration facilities."5 Small power and cogeneration facilities meeting
FERC requirements are called "Qualifying Facilities" (hereafter "QFs").
Section 210 contains the substantive provisions of PURPA which
directs FERC to promulgate rules which require utilities to buy electricity
from and sell electricity to QFs 6 at rates which are "just and reasonable"
to the consumers of the utility, in the public interest, and are
non-discriminating to cogenerators and small power producers.8 7 Section
210 also requires FERC to devise a formula to be used in determining
rates payable for QF power. No buy-back (purchase) rate may exceed
"the incremental cost to the electric utility of alternative electrical
energy".88 The incremental cost of alternative electrical energy is the cost
of the electricity the utility would generate or purchase from another
source but for the purchase from a QF.s9 These costs are also known as
"avoided costs" and FERC requires the rates payable to QFs to equal the
90
avoided costs of the utility.
State regulatory authorities are directed to implement FERC rules
implemented under PURPA. 91 QFs are also exempted from certain
92
federal and state laws governing utilities.
c) Effects of PURPA
By any standard of assessment PURPA has been a phenomenal success,
especially in developing cogeneration. In 1990, total U.S. cogenerating
capacity approached 9,000 mw. By May 1988, would-be producers
totalling 67,000 mw of generating capacity had filed applications with
FERC for QF status. Of these, contracts for 31,039 mw had actually been
completed. One study suggests that, given high fossil-fuel prices and high
avoided costs for power, cogeneration capacity may reach 131,600 mw

85. 16 U.S.C.s. 796 (17)(C), (18)(B). These criteria are set out in 18 C.F.R. ss. 292.203-.206

(1987). A qualifying small power production facility must have a capacity of no greater than
80mw; at least 75% of its total energy input must be from the sources stipulated above.
Qualifying cogeneration facilities must meetcertain efficiency standards. Neither small power
production nor cogeneration facilities may be more than 50% owned by an electric utility or
an electric utility holding company.

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

16 U.S.C. s. 824a-3(a) (1988); see 18 C.F.R. s. 292.303 (1987).
16 U.S.C. s. 824a-3(b-c) (1988).
16 U.S.C. s. 824a - 3(b), (d) (1988).
16U.S.C. s. 824a - 3(d) (1988).
18 C.F.R. ss. 292.304(a)-(b) (1987).
16 U.S.C. s. 824a-3(f) (1988).

92.16 U.S.C.s. 824a-3(e) (1988). These laws include the Federal PowerAct, the Public Utility
Holding Company Act, and "State laws and regulations respecting the rates, or respecting the

financial or organizational regulation of electric utilities...".
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by the year 2000. 91 In terms of small power production facilities using
renewable energy sources, applications totalling 16,335 mw of potential
generating capacity had been filed with FERC by the end of 1987; at the
end of 1985, 6,000 mw had already been built.9 4 In many cases,
PURPA-based generating capacity has delayed construction of or led to
the cancellation of coal-fired or nuclearbaseloadplants. PURPA-capacity
added nationally in the 1980s has even outstripped new capacity added
from "conventional" sources over the same period. 95 Qualifying96facilities
now produce over 8% of total American generating capacity.
The amount of PURPA-based capacity has varied from state-to-state.
In California, QFs have built almost all of that state's new generating
capacity in the 1980s; 97 In Maine, cogenerators and small producers
constituted 2% of total generating capacity in 1981; by 1992 that figure
will soar to 32%.98 In New Hampshire, 223 mw of QF power representing
16% of that state's peak load has been contracted. 9 9 When a 200 mw
allotment of generating capacity was offered up for QF purchase in New
England in 1988, 73 bids representing a total of 4,729 mw of capacity
were received from 57 would-be suppliersY°°
However, PURPA's success has not been evenly distributed. In
Illinois, excess generating capacity resulted in low avoided costs for QF
production. 1 1 Low prices precluded significant QF development.
Under PURPA, state regulatory commissions were obliged to develop
and adoptprocedures by which the PURPA scheme would be implemented.
Typically, state commissions issue a directive to utilities operating within
the jurisdiction ordering them to set aside a certain amount of generating
capacity (called an "increment" or "decrement") for purchase by QFs.
Each allotment of capacity represents a portion of the utility's own
anticipated load growth which is stripped from the utility and passed over
to QFs. 102
93. R.F. Naill, F.P. Wood and P.L. Rollin, "Cogeneration: Boom orBust?", Pub. Util. Fort. 122:

Sept. 15, 1988.
94. C.P. Shea, supra,note 53, at p. 46.
95. J.W. Griggs, "Competitive Bidding and Independent Power Producers" (1988), 9 Energy
LJ. 415, at p. 418.

96. B.L.Vanderlinden,"Bidding Farewell to the Social Costs of Electricity Production: Pricing
Alternative Energy under the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act" (1988). 13 J. Corp. L.
1011, at p. 1012.
97. C.P. Shea, supra,note 53, at p. 45.
98. "Cogeneration and Small Power Production: Energy Alternatives for Maine's Future",
Report issued by Central Maine Power, 1987, p. 3.
99. S.P. Voll. "The New Hampshire Experience with the Development of Qualifying
Facilities" (1988), Publ. Util. Fort. 122; Sept. 15, 1988, at pp. 25-33.
100. R.F. Naill, et al, supra, note 94.
101. llinois Commerce Commission, "Independent Power Production in Illinois", p. vi.
102. Ctl. Maine Power, supra, note 98, at p. 9.
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Each decrement carries with it a state-approved rate schedule reflecting
the utility's full avoided cost of producing that same block of power.
Prospective QFs are invited to submit applications for all or any portion
of the block. Applicants are then selected by the utility on the basis of
evaluative criteria and procedures which may vary between states. In
general, the evaluative criteria focus upon the soundness of a project's
conception, adequacy offinancial and managerial backing, and anticipated
construction and operating costs. 03 The procedures used to aid in ranking
and/or selecting applicants may reflect a "first past the post", a
"case-by-case", or a bidding-style approach.1 4
d)

The Secret of PURPA'sSuccess

PURPA was a boon to the small power production industry in part
because it mandated that QFs be paid at a utility's full avoided cost of
production even if the QF was able to produce power for less than that
amount. In that respect PURPA created a strong financial incentive for
alternative energy producers to enter the market'0 5 and to produce energy
as efficiently as possible. With market access now assured, QFs and
utilities began to square off over issues of avoided costs.
e) Avoided Costs under PURPA
i)

The Role of the States

The crucial role played by state governments vested with the responsibility
for implementing PURPA's guidelines should not be underestimated.
PURPA stipulated that utilities purchase power from QFs at a rate not
exceeding the incremental cost to the utility of alternative electrical
energy. 0 6 FERC interpreted "incremental cost" in terms of "avoided
cost" which is defined as the "incremental costs to an electric utility of
electric energy or capacity or both which, but for the purchase from the
[QF], such utility would generate itself orpurchasefrom another source". 07
FERC went further and set out various factors to be considered in

103.Ibid., at pp. 11, 12.
104. In theory, bidding systems allow utilities to select the most efficient QF from amongst

many would-be suppliers. For a good discussion of the merits and demerits of bidding see B.L.
Vanderlinden, supra, note 97, at pp. 1044-45; Central Maine Power, supra,note 98, at pp.
11-12; J.W. Griggs, supra, note 95.

105. B.L. Vanderlinden, supra, note 96, at p. 1012.
106. 16 U.S.C. s. 824 a - 3(d) (1988).
107. 18 C.F.R. s. 292.101(b)(6) (1987).
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determining avoided costs. l°tThe relative weight to be assigned to these
factors and, most importantly, the determination of the precise rates
payable for QF power rested, ultimately, with each state. Some states
have given utilities broad discretion in determining avoided costs; others
have structured their discretion somewhat by adding additional factors
for utilities to consider, while others have developed strict methodologies
to be applied by utilities in determining avoided costs.'0gThe most
"interventionist" states in this respect have tended to be those with policy
predispositions favourable to small power.110 Some states have adopted
standard-form contracts to help redress the imbalance of.bargaining
power between utilities and small producers."'
ii) Avoided Cost Methodologies
The proper methodology to be employed in determining avoided costs is
the center of considerable controversy.
The most important components of avoided costs are energy (a
variable cost) and capacity(a fixed cost). Energy cost savings are realized
"when the utility reduces the operating level of any oil, gas, coal or
nuclear plant in response to a reduced load induced by the presence of a
small producer on the utility system."' 2 The amount of energy savings
realizable by a utility depends upon the cost of fuel at a given moment and
the type of generator burning the fuel. There is clear agreement that
energy costs are always part of a utility's avoided costs. There is less
agreement, however, on the question of the capacity component. Capacity
108. These factors include, inter alia, the availability of QF power to the utility in terms of: i)
"dispatchability" (ease of calling up) of QFpower: ii) QFreliability: iii) terms of any applicable
contracts; iv) ability to coordinate QF planned interruptions of service with the utility's own
planned interruptions; v) usefulness of the QF to the system in emergencies; vi) individual and
aggregate value of energy and capacity from QFs on the system; and vii) smaller capacity
increments and shorter lead times available from QFs. An additional factor worth noting is
to the ability of the
"The relationship of the availability of energy or capacity from the QF ...
electric utility to avoid costs, including the deferral of capacity additions and the reduction of
fossil fuel use." 18 C.F.R. s. 292.304(e)(2-3).
109. N. Hamilton, supra, note 62, at p. 447-48
110. "California's state government has actively promoted new energy sources.
Policymakers...began rewriting the rules governing the state's utility industry even before
PURPA had been pieced together in Washington, D.C....the [California Public Utilities]
Commission's philosophy is that utilities and independent power producers have an unequal
relationship and that careful rules are needed to encourage a competitive new industry." C.
Flavin, Electricity's Future (Washington: Worldwatch Instit., 1984), at p. 51. The New
Hampshire legislature specifically recognized the need to encourage non-fossil fuel based
cogeneration facilities - thus anticipating the possibility that fossil fuel price fluctuations might
result in a displacement of renewable-energy based generators. S.P. Voll, supra,note 99.
111. See, e.g., N. Hamilton, supra, note 62.
112. Ibid., at p. 450.
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represents a utility's fixed, "sunken" capital investment in generating
facilities. Although a FERC regulation makes explicit reference to energy
and capacity costs,"1 3 the relative contribution of the capacity component

to an avoided cost determination depends upon two further considerations.
First, a utility will be unwilling to allow any (or any significant)
capacity payments to be made where there is excess generating capacity
in the system. The argument made here is that QF power in this
circumstance is not needed and that therefore capacity payments are also
unnecessary. One cannot avoid a cost already incurred. 4
To this argument small producers reply that excess capacity arises in
"lumps" as new capacity is added by a utility. Since excess capacity will
disappear in time, QF power will inevitably become necessary. A
long-term contract between the QF and the utility can establish an
equitable rate schedule having regard to the temporary surplus on the
system. In any event, it is at least disingenuous for a utility to maintain its
own ambitious building programs to meet future demand while denying
15
any need for QF power.)
Second, utilities argue that the inability of small power technology to
provide "firm" (i.e. steady and reliable) power means that utilities must
have sufficient capacity "on hand" to substitute for out of service
producers; and continue to build new facilities to meet future demand.
Again, the claim is that the utility in reality defers less capacity than the
small producer appears to be displacing. 6
Small producers counter this argument in three ways. First, it is not
clear that small producers, considered in the aggregate, are any less
reliable (in terms of the reliability of their contribution to the whole
system) than any of the large baseload plants a utility operates. It is not
uncommon for two 1,000 mw nuclear plants to be shut down
simultaneously. Utilities must be able to supply enough electricity from
other sources to replace the amount lost. There is no reason why small
producers should not be similarly treated." 7 Secondly, it is unfair for
utilities to expect a higher standard of reliability from small producers'
technology than from their own. A certain amount of unpredictability in
the system is inevitable. It should be reckoned with and accommodated
rather than used as a device to preempt the development of new power

113. 18 C.F.R. ss. 292.304(e), 292.302(b) (1987).
114; B.L. Vanderlinden, supra, note 96, at p. 1025.
115. N. Hamilton, supra., note 62, at pp. 452-53.

116. Ibid.
117. C. Flavin, supra, note 110.
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sources.'i Thirdly, certain small power technologies are well established
and reliable. These include cogeneration and small hydro facilities. Such
facilities should therefore be eligible for significant avoided capacity
payments. In short, utilities must be willing to take a longer-range
perspective on the role that can be played by small producers on the
energy stage.
A common tool used by American regulators and utilities to ascertain
avoided costs is a hypothetical unit or "proxy plant". The "proxy" is
usually a facility the utility would have built but for the willingness of
small producers to generate the same amount of power themselves. The
utility may put forth a fairly large, fossil-fuel or nuclear fired baseload
plant as the proxy. Alternatively, the utility may put forth a low cost
peaking plant (such as a gas turbine) as the proxy. Small producers favour
large baseload plants as proxies (capital costs and hence avoided capacity
costs) are higher. Utilities favour peaking plants, which feature low
capital costs but high fuel costs. (This is why they are only called into
service at times of peak demand.)11 9 One way of reconciling these
approaches to satisfy both parties is to use whichever type of proxy is
appropriate in light of the duration of the contract being contemplated for
QF power. Since peaking plants have short construction lead times a
"peaking proxy" may well be used in calculating short-run capacity
credits.1 20
iii) Impact of State "Mini-PURPAs" on Avoided Costs
Under PURPA, states were required to pass legislation ("niini-PURPAs")
embodying the guidelines put forth in the Act.12 1 Certain states perceived
this requirement as an opportunity for them to further encourage the
development of small power production by requiring utilities to purchase
QF power at rates in excess of utilities' full avoided costs. The criteria
utilized by regulatory commissions in thus setting rates could be justified
(if challenged) by virtue of the independent grant of discretion to set rates
for QF purchasers conferred upon regulatory commissions by state
legislatures.122

118. N. Hamilton, supra, note 62, at p. 452.
119. Various states have opted for one or the other method, B.L. Vanderlinden, supra,note 96,
at p. 1026.
120. Ibid., at p. 1027.
121.16 U.S.C. s. 824a-3(f) (1988).
122. B.L. Vanderlinden,supra, note 96, atp. 1030. Note that states were also able, under certain
circumstances, to set rates at lower than full avoided cost: 18 C.F.R. s. 292.304(b)(3) (1987).
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Court challenges to state authority to set rates in excess of full avoided
cost have occurred in Kansas and New York. In Kansas, that state's
Supreme Court ruled that states had no right to set such a rate, as FERC
had already occupied the field.'2 3FERC's standard established a statutory
maximum rate for purchases from QFs. Absent a waiver granted by
FERC to the state regulatory authority exempting the authority from the
full avoided cost rule, the statutory maximum rate would apply. 24
An inherent ambiguity within FERC's regulations on this matter
became apparent when the New York Court of Appeal upheld that state's
prescribed minimum purchase price of 6 cents/kwh, which was above full
avoided costs for some utilities."z In its reasons for judgment, the Court
found that PURPA's avoided cost standard was not an "absolute ceiling"
on avoided costs rates set either by federal or state authorities, but rather
was meant to put a cap only on rates set by FERC in the context of the
federal government's role in encouraging alternativepower.1 6The Court
also cited a FERC explanation of its own regulations to the effect that
states were free to set rates which would result in even greater
encouragement of alternative technologies. 127 An appeal of the Court of
Appeal's decision to the U.S. Supreme Court was dismissed for want of
a substantial federal question. 128 As a result, New York's statute was
upheld, but this area of law remains unsettled. 29
FERC has itself performed a volteface, however, and now considers
it impermissible for states to set avoided cost rates in excess of PURPA's
full avoided cost standard. 3 ' A multi-state utility, Orange and Rockland
Utilities, Inc., had sought a declaration that New York's statutory
minimum rate for QF electricity infringed upon interstate commerce. The
utility pointed out that it was interconnected with interstate power grids.
Under the utility's system of allocating wholesale power costs, the costs

123. Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 676 P. 2d 764 (Kan. 1984).
124. Ibid., at 766-67. A FERC waiver may be granted where an applicant demonstrates that

compliance with any requirements oftheregulations is notnecessary to encourage cogeneration
on small power production and is not otherwise required under Section 210 of PURPA: 18
C.F.R. 292.403 (1987). It should also be noted that PURPA also contemplated that QFs and
utilities may specifically contract for a power purchase rate lower than the full avoided cost
standard: 18 C.F.R. s. 292.301(b)(1) (1987).
125. Consol'd Edison v. PublicServ. Comm'n, 483 N.Y.S. 2d 153 (Ct. App. 1984).

126. Ibid., at p. 157.
127. Ibid., at pp. 157-58.
128. Consol'dEdison v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 470 U.S. 1075 (1985).

129. B.L. Vanderlinden, supra,note 96, at p. 1031. See alsoTomain et al,supra,note 3, at pp.
548-50.
130. Re Orange & Rockland Utilities, Inc., 92 PUR 4th 1, (FERC 1988). FERC Commissioner
Sousa gave a separate concurring opinion at ibid., p. 28; Commissioner Stalon also gave a

separate concurring opinion: 93 PUR 4th 364 (FERC 1988).
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of electricity purchased from New York QFs would be partly passed on
to out-of-state consumers because the power purchased from those QFs
would be shared with subsidiary out-of-state utilities. It was settled law
that federal regulatory authority governed interstate sales of electricity.
Hence, the utility argued, only PURPA's avoided cost standard should
apply.
FERC agreed, holding that PURPA prohibited states from imposing
rates for wholesale purchases of QF electricity in excess of the
PURPA-defmed standard in the area of interstate commerce. Such rates
were "no longer appropriate" because of their "substantial adverse
impact on costs to utilities and to consumers". 3 Moreover, the success
of PURPA in encouraging the development of cogeneration meant that
32
rates in excess of the full avoided cost standard were no longer necessary.
However, FERC left open the possibility that states may set rates in
excess of full avoided costs if such rates are the manifest expression of a
state policy directing the subsidization of certain forms of QF power such
as renewable technologies or where changing circumstances (for instance,
another "energy crisis") warrant an urgent effort to quickly add more QF
33
production.
Perhaps in response to criticisms that FERC had inappropriately made
use of a complaint proceeding to effect a policy change which should
34
have been made only in accordance with full rule-making procedures,
FERC later stayed its order pending the outcome of a rule-making
proceeding addressing the issues raised in the Orange & Rockland
decision.'35
The upshot of this decision, if upheld, seems to be that state impositions
of rates in excess of full avoided costs are impermissible except, perhaps,
in the context of encouraging specific forms of small power production.
Underlying this possible loophole or exception is the fact that renewable
energy-based small production has begun to lag behind cogeneration as
13 6
the preferred type of QF for investors.

131. Ibid., at pp. 15, 31.
132. Ibid.
133. 93 PUR 4th 364 (FERC 1988), at p. 380.
134. See the dissenting opinion of FERC Commissioner Trabant in Re Orange & Rockland
Utilities,Inc., 92 PUR 4th, at pp. 17-28 (FERC 1988).
135. See Pub. Util. Fort. 123: 45, May 11, 1989.
136. Recall that cogeneration may utilize renewable or fossil fuel. See B.L. Vanderlinden,
supra,note 96, at pp. 1034-1037. If the price of fossil fuel is very low, then cogenerators will
switch to fossil fuels - defeating PURPA's purposes.
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iv)

CanAvoidedCostsReflectSmallPower'sReduced"Externalities?"

The reader will recall my discussion of the"externalities" issue in relation
to small power.137 Costs of electric production not borne by utilities are
of severalkinds. Readily apparent are social costs resulting from pollution.
Additional costs may be those resulting from geopolitical dependency on
foreign sources of oil (e.g. military expenditures aimed at securing those
sources from disruption), compensating indigenous peoples affected by
massive flooding due to hydroelectric projects, or invading scenic areas
with power plants and transmission lines.' 31However, efforts to include
the avoided social costs of electrical generation have met with little
39

success.1

Nevertheless, a good argument may be made to the effect that certain
aspects of the PURPA scheme may open the door to the internalizing of
now externalized costs in determining rates payable forrenewable-energy
based small projects.
Atpresent, FERC directs stateutility commissions to consider avoided
costs attributable both to the reduction of fossil fuel use and to the smaller
capacity increments and shorter construction lead times required by small
facilities. 140 In terms of the latter criterion the types of costs avoided are
those resulting from the greater economic risks inherent to the reliance
upon large facilities with long lead-times (cost overruns, financial market
changes, undervaluation of electricity rates due to excess capacity when
plants are completed, and so on).
Several states already figure certain types of avoided social costs into
QF rate schedules. For instance, Virginia's public utilities commission
adds 15% to a utility's calculated avoided costs based on the societal and
environmental benefits realized by increasing the total share of QF
production in that state. Commissions in Idaho, North Carolina and New
York rank production technologies by the degree of social risk inherent
in their deployment. Thus, small hydro projects receive higher avoided
cost payments than fossil-fuel or biomass based projects because of the
41
uncertainties of price and supply which beset the latter technologies.

137. Supra, at p. 537.

138. Ibid., at pp. 1037-38.
139. Ibid.
140. 18 C.F.R. ss. 292.304(e)(3), (e)(2)(vii) (1987).
141. B.L. Vanderlinden, supra.,note 96, at pp. 1039-43. See also, "External Social Costs as
aFactorin Least-CostPlanning-An Emerging Concept", Pub. Util. Fort. 124: Aug. 31,1989,

at p. 43; "Massachusetts, California Set Policy on Externalities", Pub. Util. Fort. 128:
September 1, 1991, at p. 43.
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Whether a particular state's subsidy program violates FERC's new
policy stance on QF rates in excess of full avoided costs will depend on
the nature of the specific state program impugned by the utility. Should
a state commission wish to do so, however, a program implemented to
foster specific renewable-energy technologies which include allowances
for a broader range of avoided social costs may well survive FERC's
scrutiny because FERC has indicated a possible willingness to grant
exemptions from its policy for such programs.14
v) Avoided Cost Payments: "Justand Reasonable" to Consumers?
QFs may receive a utility's full avoided costs of generation even if the QF
is able to produce power for less than that rate. Some critics have attacked
this policy as amounting to a subsidization of small power production.
Moreover, the additional benefit received by the QF owner above
production costs may be in violation of PURPA's own requirement that
rates paid for QF power be "just and reasonable" to the utility's
consumers. 143 This argument was considered and rejected by the U.S.
Supreme Court in 1983."44 In its decision, the Court found that the
possibility that rather high prices (viewed through the lens of traditional
utility rate-setting concepts such as "just and reasonable") might be paid
for QF power did not automatically invalidate the full avoided cost
standard contained in the relevant FERC regulation. Rather, according to
the Court, the avoided cost rule was enacted in concordance with FERC's
mandate under PURPA to devise a rule which would provide an incentive
for the development of small power production and cogeneration t45 I
mention this decision here in order to illustrate the importance of a clear
and express statement of legislative purpose in developing any legislative
initiative designed to foster small power production. I will argue later in
the paper that the absence of any such purpose in Canadian legislation or
policy directives is a stumbling block to increased small power production
in Canada.

142. The Virginia State Corporation Commission has held that Virginia's 15% avoided cost
allowance for "intangible benefits" accruing from QFs does not violate the Orange&Rockland
rule: Re Potomac Edison Co., 95 PUR 4th 1 (Va. S.C.C.).
143. 16 U.S.C.s. 824a-3(b) (1988). See J.W. Grigg, supra,note 95,atpp. 418-22. (The reader

will recall that, traditionally, utilities are entitled to receive only a "just and reasonable" rate
of return.)
144. American PaperInstitute v. American Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 103 S.Ct. 1921.

145. Ibid., at pp. 1928-30.
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f) IncreasedCompetition in the Electricity Market
The revolution set off by PURPA may be devouring its own children.
That is, PURPA may represent only the first step in a progressive
deregulation of the electricity-generation business. Some states 146 have
adopted a mandatory competitive bidding system amongst QFs for
available blocks of power. FERC recently sanctioned the adoption of
bidding systems by states on a voluntary basis. 14 7 Additionally, FERC has
announced plans to enact rules allowing utilities to compete in bidding for
increments of generating capacity provided that the power they propose
to sell in fact comes from a facility not in their rate base. In response to
concerns that QF bids would be overwhelmed by bids from utilities
(whose deep pockets enable them to make offers to produce power for
less than non-utility QF costs of production) FERC's rules would still
obligate utilities to purchase a portion of power needs from QFs.'48 These
proposals have been extremely controversial. 4 9 From a utility perspective,
it is advantageous to be able to compete with QFs. Inefficient utilities,
however, will fall victim to market forces. From a small producer
perspective bidding is less favourably received because it endangers the
guaranteed market conferred upon them by PURPA. From a consumer
perspective increased competition may result in lower rates.
g) Increased Use of FossilFuels by QFs
In the early 1980s energy prices began to fall from the heights attained in
the late 1970s. In particular, new supplies of relatively inexpensive
natural gas became available. The ability of qualifying cogeneration
facilities to use fossil-fuels such as natural gas has led to an increasing
displacement of non-fossil fuel based generation in favour of fossil-fuelled
facilities built to take advantage of very low-priced fuels. The share of
proposed new small power and cogeneration generation that would rely
onrenewable energy sources is falling, from 29% in 1986 to 12% in 1987.
This is ironic in light of PURPA's goals, which were to move away from
oil and gas resources, diversify the sources of U.S. energy and encourage

146. For instance: Maine, Vermont, Virginia, New Hampshire and Texas.

147. B.L. Vanderlinden, supra, note 96, at p. 1044.
148. C. Romo, "Observers Predict Electric Proposals will 'Fundamentally Change' Industry",
Pub. Util. Fort. 122: 40-44. April 14, 1988, esp. at p. 40.Nv
149. See for example, P. Nulty, "Utilities Flirt with Adam Smith", Fortune, June 6, 1988: 173
(excellent general overview): M.J. Zimmer and R.D. Feldman, "The Future of Independent
Power Production" 2 Nat. Res. and Envt. 28 (Spring 1987); J.W. Griggs, op cit., note 105, C.
Romo, ibid;"Independents Gearing Up for Battle with Electric Utilities", Pub. Util. Fort. 122:
37-40, Feb. 18, 1988. As of January, 1991, these rules had not been enacted. It is likely that
they have been "shelved", at least for the time being.
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the use of renewable energy sources.150 What is needed to counteract this
tendency is a new regulatory initiative or incentive which would reserve
a share of new generating capacity for renewable power sources. 5 '
h) Lessonsfrom PURPA
To conclude my discussions of the U.S. experience in small power
production I will extract what I perceive to be the basic "lessons" from
PURPA. These concern fundamental aspects of small power production
and constitute the new ground rules or context for discussions of "alternate"
energy sources in Canada.
First, the establishment of a viable small power production industry
requires the enactment of ground-breaking legislation as its sine qua non.
This industry simply would not have come into existence as it has in the
52
United States without PURPA.
Second, it was essential that PURPA contained a clear and express
statement of purpose. By making clear the policy objectives underlying
PURPA's enactment all parties, governmental or otherwise, were
compelled to deal with the challenge of small power production in a
context defined by PURPA's objectives. Insofar as PURPA's objectives
reflect the social benefits realizable by the increased use of small power
production the achievement of PURPA's objective means that real
benefits accrue to society as a whole.
PURPA has also helped to call into question the fundamental
assumptions underlying "business as usual" electricity generation in the
United States. "Bigger" does not necessarily always mean "better".
Utilities have been challenged to justify the continued existence of and
construction of energy "megaprojects". In many instances it has been
impossible to establish such justification. In a sense then, PURPA has
worked to "level the playing field" for all energy producers and has
initiated a thorough scrutiny of the true costs of alternate sources of
energy.

150. J.W. Griggs, supra,note 95, at p. 424. See also D.E. Simmons, "Section 210 of PURPA:
Are Mid-Course Corrections Needed?" 2 Nat. Res. and Envt. 25-27 (Spring 1987), at p. 26.
151. C.P. Shea, supra, note 53, at p. 46. See also J.W. Griggs, ibid., at p. 421.

152. PURPA may have created a"critical mass" of small-power technology and expertise such
that the industry itself now generates innovation independently of governmental support.
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V.

The CanadianExperience with Small Power Production

1. Introduction
Small power production presently makes a very small contribution to the
amount of electricity generated in Canada. For instance, small producers
are responsible for less than 5% of Ontario's electricalproduction; 53 ihey
account for little more than 3% of generating capacity in Nova Scotia 54
and less than 1% of Saskatchewan's needs.155 In most provinces, except
Ontario, the number of small producers could likely be counted on both
hands. In fact, small power production in Canada generated far more
theoretical than practical discussion until the mid 1980s.
Nevertheless, more and more potential small producers are beginning
to emerge in most Canadian jurisdictions. For example, generating
capacity from small producers will increase by over 75% over the next
few years in Ontario, Quebec, Alberta and British Columbia. 56 Prodded
by legislators, utilities have begun to invite increased involvement with
1 57
small producers.
The question I wish to consider in this Part of the paper is whether the
"lessons" derived from the American experience with small power
production can be usefully applied in Canada in order to assist in the
development of a viable Canadian small power production industry. To
put it another way; "Do we need a Canadian PURPA?". In order to be able
to make informed comparisons between the United States and Canada in
this area I will proceed by first setting out the regulatory framework of
electrical generation in Canada. Second, I will contend that the public
utility sector in Canada has been beset by the same structural difficulties
now gripping the American utility sector. Third, the existing impediments
to small power production in Canada will be outlined.
Only Alberta has passed small power production legislation. As my
fourth task I will outline and assess the likely effectivity of this legislation
in furthering the growth of small power in Alberta. Reference will also be
made to recent energy policy developments in Ontario. The absence of
legislation removing entrenched obstacles to small power inhibits its

153. M. Mittelstaedt, "OntarioHydroFacesReversal of EnergyPolicies" Globe and Mail, Nov.
24, 1990, at p. 3.
154. Interview with James McNiven, Dean, Faculty of Management, Dalhousie University.,

Nov. 7, 1990.
155. J. Passmore, "Presentation to Nova Scotia Board of Commissioners of Public Utilities"
In Re: An Application of NSPCRelating to the Setting ofRatesforElectricityPurchasedfrom

IndependentPower Producers, 1990.
156. "Electricity", Energy Analects, Oct. 8, 1990.
157. See A. Stelmakowich, "Electricity",EnergyinCanada:1990-1991. (Don Mills: Southam
Business Info. and Communications Group, 1990), esp. at pp. 231-236.
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development in Canada. Finally, the issue of electricity pricing will be
addressed, with specific reference to recent developments in Nova
Scotia.
2. The Regulatory Frameworkof Electricity Generationin Canada
In Canadajurisdiction over the field of electricity generation is exercised
by the provinces. By s. 92A(l) of the ConstitutionAct,1867the legislature
of each province "may exclusively make laws in relation to... c)
development, conservation and management of sites and facilities in the
15 8
province for the generation and production of electrical energy".
Most Canadian utilities are Crown corporations owned by provincial
governments. All Canadian utilities (except Ontario Hydro) are regulated.
That is, activities of these utilities are subject to governmental regulatory
oversight.159
3. The Crisisof "Big Power" in Canada
As an industrialized country Canada was not immune to the effects of the
"oil shocks" of the 1970s. Rising fuel prices, and rising construction costs
prompted rate increases which then depressed demand for electricity.
Many utilities had to borrow money at high interest rates to finance their
projects. As the 1980s began, then, Canadian utilities were caught in a
financial maelstrom. Massive debts were incurred; some utilities were
barely able to meet interest payments on their debts. 160 In Nova Scotia
"rate shocks" were averted only by provincial subsidization of power

158. ConstitutionAct, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict, c. 3. This section was added to the
Constitution in 1982. According to Hogg, this provision is declaratory of the pre-1982 law,
under which electricity generation was a provincial matter by s. 92(10) of the.ConstitutionAct,
1867 ("local works and undertakings"). P.W. Hogg, ConstitutionalLawof Canada,(2nd ed.)
(Toronto: Carswell, 1985), at p. 597.
159. E.g., see Public UtilitiesAct,R.S.N.S. 1989, c.380, which sets out the duties of the Nova
ScotiaBoard of Commissioners of Public Utilities over public utilities including the provincial
utility (Nova Scotia Power Corporation; see the Power CorporationAct, R.S.N.S. 1989, c.
351).
160. For example, in 1985 the Nova Scotia Power Corporation (NSPC) was able to pay only
70 cents out of each dollar of interest it owed: Between 1980 and 1985 the portion of each
revenue dollar needed to fimance interest on Canada's utility debt rose from 33.2 to 42.7 cents
- greater than the amount required to service the federal government's debt. Within that same
time period long-term debt for Canadian utility expansion rose from $37.6 to $62.9 billion
(67.4% increase): . Passmore, supra, note 46, at pp. 10-12.
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rates. 161 The extent of Canada's energy crisis was revealed by a host of
governmental initiatives designed to alleviate Canadian dependency on
imported oil. For instance, the federal government's Canadian Oil
Substitution Program (COSP) assisted households in converting from oil
to natural gas, electricity and renewable energy sources.' 62Increased
emphasis was placed on exports and utilizing indigenous resources to
63
generate electricity.
True, provinces with ample hydroelectric power (British Columbia,
Manitoba, Quebec) were to some extent shielded from the crunch.
Nevertheless, many of the difficulties which beset American utilities also
gripped Canadian utilities. Future demand remains uncertain. Cogeneration
and "alternate" power sources (which offer short construction lead times
and are fuel efficient) are thus increasingly seen as desirable energy
options.164 Yet obstacles stand in the path of alternate energy producers.
4. Economic andInstitutionalObstacles to Small Power Production
The precise character of the institutional impediments to the development
of small power in Canada may differ from those in the United States.
Nevertheless, they have common roots; the entrenched resistance of
utilities to perceived encroachments upon their integrity.
Small power producers have generally encountered little difficulty in
interconnecting with utilities. ,65 However, prices paid for small producer
power have tended to be very low while high rates are charged for
"backup" or standby utility services. 6 6 Prices paid for electricity not
generated by utilities reflected a general consensus amongst Canadian
utilities that only the utility's avoided fuel costs should be taken into
account.167At the same time, however, the American consensus under
PURPA was that avoided costs should include an allowance for both thd
avoided fuel and capacity costs of the utility.
The monopsonist position of utilities as sole buyers for small producer
electricity plus their vastly superior resources (financial and expertise)

161. Between 1974-1989 the cost of electricity to residential consumers more than quadrupled.
Government subsidies were paid between 1978-1986: (Unpublished, Nova Scotia Dept. of
Mines and Energy, 1991).
162. International Energy Agency, supra, note 7, at p. 60.
163. See Public Utilities Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 380, s. 48.
164.A.E. Reinsch and E.F. Battle, supra, note 14, at p. 1.
165. Ibid., at p. 68..
166. Ontario Hydro, in 1982, offered producers 1.6 cents/kwh for the electricity they produced
and charged about 5 cents/kwh for electricity purchased from the utility. L. Solomon, supra,
note 47, at p. 113. See also A. Stelmakowich, supra,note 157, at p. 222 ..
167. A.E. Reinsch and E.F. Battle, supra,note 14, at p. 73.
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have allowed them to dictate terms to small producers. For instance, in
1983 a private developer acquired the right to develop a small hydro site
in Nova Scotia. At first, the Nova Scotia Power Corporation (hereafter
called "NSPC") maintained that the plant's power was not needed. When
the developer persisted in his plan to build the plant NSPC relented only
to the extent that it was willing to pay the producer an amount equal to
70% of avoided fuel costs. This latter concession was only gained after
the developer appealed to NSPC's political overseers. 68 On another
level, Ontario Hydro has consistently used its enormous organizational
69
resources to swamp and stifle dissenters.
In short, the obstacles faced by small producers in Canada are of two
kinds. Economic obstacles exist chiefly in the context of the prices
offered for small power and in utility willingness to use its superior
resources of information and expertise in order to inflict heavy transactional
costs upon would-be producers. Institutionally, obstacles consist in the
indifferent or actively hostile stances taken by utilities toward small
producers.
The next question to be asked is whether any provincial government
has enacted legislation or established a policy which overcomes these
obstacles or alleviates their effects.
5.

Legislationand Policy

a) Alberta
Only Alberta has passed legislation on small power production. The
Small Power Research and Development Act 17(hereinafter "the Act")
and accompanying regulations 7 ' implemented the recommendations of
ajoint enquiry on small power production held in 1987 by the province's
Energy Resources Conservation Board (E.R.C.B.) and Public Utilities
Board (P.U.B.). The inquiry's recommendations were:
1) that a small power producer of less than 2.5 mw should be classified
as a "small power producer" for legal purposes regardless of type of
energy used.
2) 100 mw of small power generation should be allowed in Alberta.
3) Utilities should pay for the power on the basis of long-term utility
avoided costs.

168. Interview with James McNiven, supra, note 154.
169. See L. Solomon, supra, note 47.
170. S.A. 1988, c. S-13.75.
171. Small Power Research andDevelopment Regulation, Alta. Reg. 336/88.
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4) Small producers should be exempt from certain regulations applicable
to "full status" utilities.
5)

The regime was to be reviewed in 1994.172

The Act itself allots 125 mw of generating capacity to small generators
using wind, hydro orbiomass energy (s. 1(a)(i)). 173Small power facilities
owned by established public utilities do not fall within the Act (s. 5 of the
Reg.). Any projects generating more than 2.5 mw are classified as "pilot
projects" (s. 1(a)(ii)(B) of the Act) and are subject to different selection
criteria than those applied to capacity projects of less than 2.5 mw.
A prospective small power producer may apply to receive a portion of
the allotment by making an application to the Minister (by s. 1(c) of the
Act; "a designated member of the Executive Council"). In deciding
whether to grant an application for a "small power producer" facility,
only a few technical requirements must be satisfied before an initial
allotment is granted by the Minister (sections 8, 6 of the Reg.). Rather
more stringent criteria (including, interalia,possible social and economic
benefits to the province; the nature and availability of the facility's
proposed fuel source; whether the nature of the technology used in the
facility would contribute to the advancement of small power production
in Alberta; s. 8(2) of the Reg.) apply in the case of "pilot project"
applications. Whether a preliminary allotment becomes "final" is
contingent upon the success of the producer in negotiating a contract with
the utility with whom the producer will interconnect. (There are at least
5 utilities in Alberta.)
The Act clearly represents a cautious attempt to foster an increased role
for small producers in Alberta. The Act's title ("Research and
Development"), its classification of certain types of projects as "pilot
projects" subject to assessment criteria such as whether it will "contribute
to the advancement of small power production in Alberta" and the
relatively small size (less than 2.5 mw) of the projects covered by
less-stringent assessment criteria testify to the status of the Act as an
"experiment".

172. Alta. Energy Resources Conservation Board Commentary, "Small Power", Canada
Energy Law Service (DeBoo, 1990), vol.3, atp. 30-3113. The program was intended to allow

an assessment of the impact of small power on the Alberta Integrated System (AIS).
173. Solar and peat energy have since been added to the list. P. Boyle, "Conservation and
'Alternatives", Energy in Canada:1990-1991. (Don Mills: Southarn Business Info. and

Communications Groups, 1990), at p. 270.
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In light of PURPA, one must certainly wonder whether there is any
need to treat small power production technologies as "experimental".
PURPA showed that small producers could participate and thrive in the
day-to-day functioning of utility systems. The main impediments to
small power before PURPA were institutional and economic in nature;
not technological (with exceptions such as photovoltaics). Such is also
the case in Canada.
Despite the uncertainties that would seem to surround any business
enterprise classified as an experiment, there has been no lack of applicants
for the 125 mw block of available generating capacity. As of June, 1990,
the allotment had been fully subscribed, although only 195 kw of new
small producer power is now "on line".1 74
At the 1987 Small Power Inquiry which preceded the passage of
Alberta's small power legislation, it was stated that "with a proper policy,
projects using renewable resources would be encouraged but should not
be given preferential treatment". 17 5 Several indicators of what constitutes
"encouragement" can be found in the Inquiry's report. Prices paid to
small producers would reflect utility avoided fuel and capacity
costs176calculated by the proxy plant method 177 utilizing a scheme of
levelized pricing. 78 Furthermore, small power producers would be
exempt from full-blown scrutiny as "utilities".17 9 Standard-form
utility-small producer contracts would be used.18 0 Each of these measures
are reasonably positive and are consistent with the spirit of PURPA. In the
end, the E.R.C.B. & P.U.B. adopted a price schedule for small power at
the high end of a range of proffered rates.' These rates have since been
2
increased.
The Inquiry, however, stopped short of recommending "special
treatment" to small power producers. This entailed rejecting "incentive
prices" and refusing to embody "socioeconomic benefits" in buyback
rates. Since both measures would impose additional costs upon consumers,

174. J. Passmore, supra,note 155, at pp. 13-16. Of the 125 mw allocation total: small hydro
- 39%; biomass/peat - 39%; Wind -18%; municipal waste - 4%.
175. ERCB Report 88-A, PUB Report E88001 Small Power Inquiry (Alberta), at p. 5.
176. Ibid.,.

177. Ibid., p. 10.
178. "Levelized pricing" provides capacity payments to small producers even if, in the short
term, only fuel costs are actually avoided. Levelizing smooths out price fluctuations which
would otherwise jeopardize the viability of many small enterprises. Ibid., at pp. 12-14.
179. Ibid., at p. 16.
180. Ibid., at pp. 16-17.
181. J. Passmore, supra,note 155, at p. 13.
182. P. Boyle, supra, note 173, at p. 270.
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it was felt that it was more appropriate to leave this sort of 1subsidization
83
to "direct government initiatives such as taxes or grants".
The Inquiry's conclusions make it clear that no credit would be
allowed for reduced "externalities" and other social costs of production.
The same conclusion was reached by Nova Scotia's Board of
Commissioners of Public Utilities in a similar hearing held last year. 8 4
The onus for recognizing such benefits of small power now clearly lies
with the provincial Legislatures.
b)

Ontario

The New Democratic government of Ontario recently announced a
moratorium on further nuclear plant construction by Ontario Hydro. 815 It
is expected that the demand for electricity which would have been
satisfied by nuclear power plants will now be met, at least in part, by small
producers. This recent policy initiative demonstrates that small power
producers may receive anindirectboost through theremoval of competitors
from markets by means of legislative or executive action.
In the absence of statutory or policy direction from the legislature,
small producers must deal with utilities on the latter's terms. The crucial
factor involved in utility-small producer relationships is almost always
the issue of price.
c) Pricesfor Small Power/Avoided Utility Costs
A significant (relative to the U.S.) small power production sector in
Canada does not exist today, mainly due to low avoided costs calculations
by utilities." 6 This is incongruous given the economic efficiencies
associated with small power production (especially cogeneration).
In most Canadian jurisdictions, power purchase rates from small
producers are less than the cost for the utility to add new base load
generation. 117 Since a new small producer incurs high capital and other
start-up costs it is discriminatory for utilities to pay for their power atrates
which reflect an averaged cost of their "old", paid for facilities and newer
facilities. British Columbia, Alberta and Nova Scotia now base their

183. Small Power Inquiry, supra,note 175, at pp. 5-6.
184. Infra, at p. 564.
185. M. Mittelstaedt, supra, note 153.
186. J. Passmore, supra, note 155.

187. In British Columbia the expansion of cogeneration in the forest products sector was
discouraged by electricity prices which were less than half the cost of new generation facilities.
J.F. Helliwell and A. J. Cox, supra, note 64, at p. 250.
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avoided cost calculations upon new capacity avoided. But even these
avoided cost rates are not expected to lead to significant new small power
generation, at least not in Nova Scotia.'
To ascertain why this may be the case, it will be instructive to review
a recent decision of the Nova Scotia Board of Commissioners of Public
Utilities (hereinafter "the Board") which outlined the methodology to be
used by NSPC in determining an avoided cost rate payable to small
producers.
d) The Nova Scotia Hearing
The decision'8 9 of the Board was the culmination of a hearing process
formally initiated upon an application of NSPC in 1989. NSPC sought to
establish criteria and a methodology that would fix prices to be paid to
small producers for power supplied to NSPC. The need for making this
determination arose after the provincial government publicized its desire
to allot a 30 mw block of generating capacity to small producers.
NSPC submitted a proposal which if accepted, would pay small
producers an amount equal to NSPC's estimated avoided cost of adding
its own new generating capacity to the system. NSPC chose the "proxy
plant" method of estimating avoided costs. This method, commonly used
in the United States, "assumes a typical future source of generation for the
utility and uses the expected capacity and operating costs of the hypothetical
or new plant as a proxy for determining long run incremental costs."'190
The specific plant chosen as NSPC's proxy was a 165mw coal-fired
baseload generating facility. Facility costs were calculated over the
course of an estimated 33 year operational life for the facility. It should
be added here that NPC generated a "spread" of several different cost
estimates for the proxy. At the "low end" were figures which approximated
the utility's "least cost" scenario (low fuel costs, no building delays,
reliable pollution-control equipment, etc.); at the "high end" were figures
representing a high cost scenario. It should also be noted that this method
assumes that small producers are entitled to be paid for utility avoided
capacity as well as fuel costs.

188. Interview with James McNiven, supra, note 154.

189. Decision of the Nova Scotia Board of Commissioners of Public Utilities, In Re - An
application of Nova Scotia Power Corp. Relating to the Setting of Rates for Electricity
Purchased from Independent Power Producers (hereafter cited as "IPP Hearing") (August 30,

1990).
190. Ibid., at p. 5.
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i) Intervenor'sCritiques
Several intervenors appeared at the Hearing to criticize the NSPC
proposal. I have grouped their criticisms into "internal" and "external"
types of critique. The former relate to flaws inherent inNSPC' s proposal;
the latter to issues of costs left out of NSPC's proposal.
Internal criticisms
The NSPC proposal was premised upon the building of a 3-unit facility.
Each unit (i.e., coal-burning generator) would generate 165 mw. Since
avoided costs are calculated on a cost/kw basis, the larger the facility, the
lower the cost/kw payable as avoided costs. Initial capital costs are high
and relatively fixed, regardless of thenumberof generating units installed.
Thus, each "additional" unit increases capital costs marginally while
doubling or tripling the facility's electrical output. Extravagant estimates
of future output could be made without undue distortion of real costs in
the present.
As it turns out, NSPC has no real intention of building the 3-unit plant
in the foreseeable future; only a 1-unit plant will be built. Several
intervenors suspected that the 3-unit plant was "cooked up" in order to
lower the avoided costs payable to small producers. 91
The Board rejected this claim on the basis that, even if Units 2 and 3
of the plant were not built there was still reason to believe that growth in
demand would soon require the addition of an equivalent amount of
generating capacity to the system anyway. The fact that it might be built
elsewhere in the province was iirelevant.'9 2 My intention here is to
illustrate that utilities may not intentionally act in such a manner as to
depress prices paid to small producers. From the small producer's
perspective, it nevertheless makes little difference whether such acts are
conscious or unconscious.
A second line of internal criticism centres upon the Board's decision
to select a rate schedule for avoided costs which reflected a relatively low
"least cost" scenario from among the alternative costs schemes submitted
by NSPC. Although the reasoning of the Board is hard to decipher on this
issue, it is clear that the Board opted for the middle-range cost estimates
or arguably, the lower-range set of estimates. 93 What are the institutional
imperatives at work here?

191. See, e.g., M. Kilfoil, "Direct Evidence", IPP Hearing, at p. 3.
192. Decision, IPP Hearing at p. 10.
193. Ibid., at p. 8.
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On the one hand, the Board believed that if it selected a cost estimate
which later turned out to be too high the utility (and thus also rate-payers)
would be, in effect, "subsidizing" the small producer. Similarly, such a
choice could also be construed as imposing an unfair charge upon the
utility and its rate-payers. Since the Board's mandate constrains it from
doing either of the above it will invariably opt for a rate schedule within
the lower range of predictions. If the estimate proves to be too low, a
revised schedule can be adopted later.
Nowhere in this discussion, though, is any consideration given to the
level of payment required to sustain and/or develop a viable small power
sector in Nova Scotia. To put it simply, there is no requirement in the
Public UtilitiesAct or the PowerCorporationAct that avoided cost rates
be "fair" or "just and reasonable" to the small power producer. Small
producers were the focus of the hearing, yet their needs or interests were
not provided for in the legal-institutional framework which structured the
hearing. What is clearly needed here is the injection of some sense of
purpose, some articulation of the policy considerations which compelled
the government to express an interest in small power in the first place
(increased efficiency, and so on). By contrast, Alberta's Small Power
Inquiry displayed a clear underlying desire to promote small power
production.
External Critiques
Prices paid for small power can also be affected by other factors such as
subsidies paid to utilities by governments.
ii)

Subsidies

A major reason for the inadequacy of present purchase prices is that they
do not take into account a variety of "subsidies" and "hidden" benefits
received by utilities which effectively obscure the true cost of generating
electricity. Essentially, avoided costs would be much higher if utilities
had to bear the entire burden of their costs and debts. For instance, public
utilities enjoy tax privileges. NSPC, as we have seen, pays no taxes. Small
producers pay taxes, and, unlike utilities, do not qualify for federal and/
or provincial debt guarantees, low cost loans, or research and development
subsidies such as the federal government's Canada Oil Substitution
Program (COSP). Many of these programs are "tapped into" by provincial
governments on behalf of utilities. 94 Such subsidies are thus intrinsically
connected with the status of utilities as government-supported enterprises.

194. J. Passmore, supra, note 46, at p. 14. See also P.S. Elder, supra,note 7.
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At the Nova Scotia hearing an intervenor protested the receipt by
NSPC of "statutory advantages" with respect to land acquisitions;
provincial debt guarantees; sale, income and property tax breaks and
Cape Breton coal subsidies. 195 The Board rejected this argument and
refused to compensate for these hidden subsidies in avoided costs
calculations payable to small producers. To do so, it held, would exceed
the Board's mandate to determine whether consumer rates are "just and
reasonable". The Board then said, "Any statutory advantages available to
NSPC that reduce costs to its customers are a real advantage to customers
and setting a rate that would reduce such advantages would be both unjust
and unreasonable." Such advantages, the Board mused, "could be offered
to NUGs (non-utility generators) if government deemed it to be an
appropriate policy". 9 ,
The Board's response on this issue was correct, in principle. The
implications of including such subsidies in market price determinatibns
carries far-reaching implications for the whole structure of government
support for and regulation of particular industries. This was a clear
instance of administrative "line-drawing". To go any further would have
involved the Board in matters of a policy or legislative nature.
iii) Externalities
The Board also rejected arguments that non-utility generators should
receive "credit" for the social (referring here to environmental, social,
political and the like) costs avoided by utilizing less environmentally
harmful, community-based modes of electrical generation. In the Board's
view, it was sufficient that NSPC's proxy plant satisfied all existing
pollution control laws and regulations.1 97 It seems to me that this
characterization of the externalities problem is misleading. It mistakenly
identifies the issue of avoided external costs of production and the issue
of pollution control. Decreased levels of pollution may result from
choosing one mode of electricity production over another. The basic
objective of reckoning for avoided external costs of production, however,
is not to ensure compliance with pollution control legislation but to aid in
determining the overall cost-effectiveness of competing electricity
generation options. Compliance with pollution control law undoubtedly
results in some avoided social costs. The actual amount of costs avoided
by specific generation options, however, may exceed, equal, or fall short
of amounts implied by legislated standards. That is, it is not apparent to
195. Decision, supra,note 189, at p. 21.

196. Ibid., at pp. 21, 26.
197. Ibid., at p. 22.
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me that the fact of compliance with pollution control law bears any
necessary relationship to the determination of the actual avoided"external"
costs of electricity generation options.
Notwithstanding this interpretive question, the Board's (and the Alberta
Inquiry's) conservative position on this issue is understandable given its
traditional, narrow mandate to ensure that rates are "just and reasonable"
to consumers. Any amount added to a conventional avoided cost tally
(that is, one which includes, say, avoided capacity and fuel costs) on the
basis of avoided social costs would be perceived as a "subsidy" to small
producers and as imposing a needless burden upon rate-payers.198 Specific
legislative or policy guidance will be required before amounts are
awarded for the avoidance of such costs. The reader will recall from my
discussions of externalities in the context of PURPA that the status of
payments made to QFs for the reduction of social costs of production has
now become problematic.19 9Within the framework of PURPA, FERC
regulations directed states to determine avoided costs having regard to
various factors including the reduction of dependence on fossil fuels and
the increased system flexibility (shorter lead times; demand
responsiveness) gained by using QF power. From a traditional viewpoint
even these provisions appeared "radical" and were often thought to be too
complex to implement. But at least those provisions were part of the
statutory scheme regulators were required to apply. Given a legislature
and a regulatory authority favourably disposed to small power production,
more "progressive" decisions were made and justified as being within
that authority's jurisdiction. Here, however, in the absence of any such
statutory direction it would appear to be unwise to expect very much in
the way of "progressive" utilities regulation in Nova Scotia.
Summary and Conclusions
Many of the obstacles to small power production identified earlier in the
paper are manifest in Canada today. They have had an inhibiting effect
on the development of small power production.
Institutional resistance to the inroads ofnon-utility electricity generation
has taken various forms which are more or less overt. A utility may utilize
its superior bargaining position visa vis the small producer in order to try
to effectively dictate terms to the producer. Discriminatory pricing
arrangements for utility purchases of small power producer electricity are
common.
198. Note in this context that the rate-payer's interest is not assumed to be identical to the public
interest.
199. Supra,at p. 550.
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These barriers were recognized, confronted and largely overcome in
the United States by PURPA in 1978. There is no statutory equivalent to
PURPA in Canada. The Alberta SmallPowerResearchandDevelopment
Act represents a cautious step forward but it is unclear that the Act is
actually intended to foster small power production on a permanent,
commercially-viable basis. The Ontario government's moratorium on
further nuclear development provides indirect support to small producers.
Discriminatory pricing arrangements remain problematic. However,
even a well-constructed method used for determining rates paid to small
producers based on avoided utility generation costs may not be enough
to make the industry viable. Subsidies paid to public utilities impede the
determination of whether a utility's real costs of producing electricity are
as low as purported. If subsidies were removed, avoided cost rates would
rise. The issue of "externalities" is given short shrift by Canadian
regulators. This is understandable in view of the absence of any legislative
mandate on the basis of which an appropriate allowance for the avoidance
of social costs of production could be made by regulatory authorities.
We need a Canadian equivalent to PURPA in each province. Only by
such legislation can the entrenched impediments to small power production
be overcome and the benefits of small power production be realized.
Utilities should not be expected to be agents of change. Regulatory
authorities are bound by statutes and doctrines developed in an era geared
to the promotion of "Big Power" as a natural monopoly.
Each provincial PURPA would contain several key features. First,
utilities would be compelled to purchase small producer power in 50 to
100 mw "decrements" as capacity is added on to the system or obsolete
utility-owned units are phased out. Small producers would be paid rates
based on full avoided costs reflecting creditforboth avoided capacity and
energy costs. Avoided social/environmental costs reflecting heretofore
externalized production costs would also figure in avoided cost
calculations. All forms ofsmallpowerproduction (including cogeneration)
would be embraced by the statute, removing the distinction presently
made between cogenerators and other producers in some jurisdictions
(notably Alberta). At the same time, however,special preference in
purchase rates might be given to encourage renewable energy based and/
or novel highly efficient technologies over those technologies which rely
upon and thereby increase our dependence upon fossil fuels. Canadian
provinces would thus be able to buck the trend, currently apparent in the
United States, towards increased fossil fuel use by small producers and
the disproportionate representation of cogenerating QFs.
Most importantly, a provincial PURPA would contain a clear and
express statement of its objectives, the foremost of which would be the

American and Canadian Responses to the Challenge of Small Power

promotion of small-scale, non-utility electricity generation. Other
objectives would include the reduction of dependence upon fossil fuels,
nuclear energy, and so on.
The same policy objectives could also be realized by simply amending
present "enabling" statutes governing the functions of provincial utility
boards. Such amendments would make conservation, energy efficiency,
the promotion of small power, and reduction of fossil fuel use a part of the
mandate of these boards. Such recognition of heretofore irrelevant
considerations could make the crucial difference in the next round of
avoided cost calculations for small-power producers between a too-low
and an adequate small power purchase rate.
Finally, certain measures (statutory or policy-based) might be taken
which would complement both of the aforementioned legislative options.
Such measures would remove the dense, opaque layers of government
(federal and provincial) subsidies currently swaddling public utilities.
They might also effectively promote small powerby removing competitors
of small producers such as nuclear power.

